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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-255

VANZIE BEASLEY,

Petitioner,

versus

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No.

VANZIE BEASLEY,

Petitioner,

versus

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment herein of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered in the above-entitled case on April 16, 1972, petition for rehearing denied on June 8, 1973.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not yet reported. It confirmed the conviction of the Petitioner for violating 18 U.S.C. Sections 1511 and 1955; and is set forth as Appendix A, p. 1a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals was entered on April 16, 1973, petition for rehearing denied on June 8, 1973. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is 18 U.S.C. Section 1955 unconstitutional because there is not a sufficient Congressional factual finding that a gambling operation, (1) operated by five or more individuals; and (2) which has been in substantially continuous operation for more than thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2000 in any single day, has an economic impact on interstate commerce?

2. Is the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the prosecution is allowed to determine the amount of defense counsel's fee when the profitability of a gambling enterprise is an element of the offense charged?

3. Is the conviction of the Petitioner due to be reversed where the United States Attorney is allowed to express his belief of the Petitioner's guilt?

4. Is the Petitioner entitled to have prospective jurors qualified as to whether they are apt to give more weight to the testimony of government agents or officials than any other witness where the bulk of the prosecution's case is presented by government agents and government officials?

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes involved are Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1955 and 1511. Because these provisions are lengthy, their pertinent text is set forth as Appendix D and E at pages 24a and 26a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division, of conspiracy wilfully and knowingly to directly and indirectly conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own all or part of a gambling business in violation of the laws of the State of Alabama, involving five or more persons for more than thirty days, in violation of 18 U.S.C., Section 1955.

The Petitioner was also convicted in the same trial, of a conspiracy to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State of Alabama pertaining to gambling, 18 U.S.C., Section 1511.

A sentence of three years imprisonment for each offense to run concurrently was imposed.

The testimony presented to the jury which heard this case in the trial court was elicited primarily from law enforcement and judicial officials, informants and witnesses named as co-conspirators but not prosecuted as such.

James R. Sadie testified to the initial agreement between Thaggard, Beasley and him and to certain facts

relating to the opening of the gambling house. Mr. Sadie is named in Count I of the indictment as a conspirator but testified for the Government.

T. J. Dunnavant testified to the preparations for opening the gambling house and its operation. Mr. Dunnavant is named as a co-conspirator in Count I of the indictment but testified on behalf of the Government.

Joe Wheeler Stuart testified concerning the operation of the gambling house. Mr. Stuart was charged as a conspirator in Count I of the indictment but was not charged as a Defendant at the trial below.

Linda Haney testified concerning the operation of the gambling house. Miss Haney was named as a co-conspirator in Count I of the indictment but was not charged as a Defendant in the trial below.

Carmelo Graffagnini, an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified as to the investigation of this case and to a conversation or conversations had with the Petitioner.

James A. Day is an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and worked undercover investigating this case. He testified to the operation of the gambling house.

Jesse Oliver Bryan is the District Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit and Crenshaw County falls within his circuit. Mr. Bryan testified to a phone call made to the former County Solicitor of Crenshaw

County, Mr. Billy King, concerning the alleged bribe accepted by the Sheriff of Crenshaw County from Thaggard, Sr.

The Honorable Ira DeMent, United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, testified in rebuttal for the United States. His testimony is considered highly prejudicial and was dealt with in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the most part fairly and accurately sets forth the facts of this case.

In June or July of 1971, Thomas L. Thaggard, Sr. asked one James R. Sadie to become a partner with him and Beasley in a gambling establishment. Thaggard stated, however, that he had heard of a recently enacted federal law against gambling and wanted to check on that law before proceeding further with the enterprise.

Prior to his appointment in that capacity the United States Attorney for that District had represented Thaggard in another prosecution, Thaggard v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 735, cert. denied 383 U.S. 958, so Thaggard went to see his former counsel about the new "federal law". The United States Attorney told Thaggard that he could not and would not advise him as to the statute but did give him a copy of it and told him to consult some other attorney about the matter. Thaggard did so, stating that there would be only three partners or owners involved in the gambling operation. This attorney told Thaggard that he obvious-

ly would be in violation of the laws of Alabama but since "less than five persons would be involved, in his opinion there would be no federal violation."

After this conference, Thaggard, Beasley, and Sadie, as the original owners, opened the gambling house in a concrete building in a remote rural area of Crenshaw County, Alabama. From July until December, 1971, the establishment operated four nights a week. Games of dice and blackjack were played; the customers were served drinks and steaks free. The actual operation of the gambling house, however, required more than three individuals. Several other persons were hired to operate the gambling tables, to prepare food, and to guard the automobiles of the patrons while they were inside the building. A busy night would see as many as fifty or sixty persons participating in the gambling.

An agent of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carmelo Graffagnini, in his official capacity became interested in the gambling house in or around the first of August, 1971. Agent Graffagnini had known the Petitioner for about four years and knew that the Petitioner operated a grocery store near the area of the gambling house. Agent Graffagnini called on the Petitioner and the Petitioner invited Agent Graffagnini to visit the establishment. Pursuant to this invitation Agent Graffagnini visited the gambling house on August 13, 1971, and found no violation of federal laws. The Petitioner informed Agent Graffagnini on or about the time of Agent Graffagnini's visit to the gambling house, that he, the Petitioner, had severed any connection with the gambling house and told Agent Graffagnini on a number of occasions that "The last

thing he wanted to do was violate a federal law." The Petitioner did not testify in the Court below, however, one of the co-defendants (T. L. Thaggard Sr.) testified that the gambling house was losing money. This was the only testimony with regard to the profitability of the gambling operation.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I IS 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1955, WHICH PUNISHES THE CONDUCT OF AN ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS (1) OF A CERTAIN VOLUME OR OVER A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, AND (2) BY A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE NOT SUPPORTED BY A CONGRESSIONAL FINDING THAT THE VOLUME OR PERIOD OF OPERATION AND NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED HAS AN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1955 prohibits a gambling operation which (i) is a violation of state law, (ii) involves five or more persons; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2000.00 in any single day.

The Court has previously held that there must be a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).

Although there may have been sufficient facts before Congress to infer that organized gambling affected interstate commerce, there is not a rational connection between that fact and the presumption set out in Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1955(b)(ii), and (iii). Therefore, this Court should grant certiorari to determine if the Petitioner's conviction can withstand constitutional scrutiny under Leary.

II THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE IF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF HARMLESS ERROR CONSISTENT WITH FAHY V. CONNECTICUT, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) AND WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

In the trial below one of the defense attorneys took the witness stand for the limited purpose of verifying the advice given the Defendant prior to the commencement of the gambling activities. On cross-examination the prosecution was allowed to determine the amount of defense counsel's fee for the purpose, as stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals at page 19, "[F]or eliciting this information was to suggest that it took a big-time gambler to pay such a fee, plus the thought that Thaggard really feared a conviction and was willing to pay a 'big fee' in the hope of avoiding conviction."

The Court of Appeals held that requiring defense counsel to disclose the amount of his fee was

improper and prejudicial, and was an error of constitutional magnitude. However, the Court held this error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch as "[T]he guilt of the defendants *** was so irrefutably evident that even in an errorless trial an acquittal would have been an incredible event." United States v. Thaggard, et al, 72-2512 at page 20 (5th Cir., 1973).

The application of the harmless error doctrine by the Court below is contra to this Court's decision in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87 (1963), wherein this Court held that the proper test to determine whether an error of constitutional magnitude is harmless "[I]s whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."

The evidence complained of is in the same nature of the prosecution arguing that its office prosecutes only the guilty, a statement which is not defensible and is reversible error, Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582 (5th Cir., 1969); and where the prosecution shows by illegal evidence that which is not before the jury in the form of admissible evidence, United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371 (5th Cir., 1971), Hall v. United States, supra.

Moreover, when the length of the trial is neither unusually long, nor the introduction of the prejudicial evidence invited, nor immediate curative action taken by the trial judge nor the incident isolated nor a curative charge given by the trial judge, it must be said

that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.

III THE PROSECUTORS' ZEAL OVERCAME FAIRNESS AND THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE IF PETITIONER WAS PREJUDICED WHEN THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY WAS ALLOWED TO STATE HIS BELIEF OF THE PETITIONER'S GUILT.

The United States Attorney's office was overzealous in the prosecution of this case, and the decision of the Court of Appeals that the prosecution was fair is contra to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295 (5th Cir., 1957); and the decision of this Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

The United States Attorney testified in rebuttal on pages 12a and 13a of the lower Court's opinion. This Court will find as follows:

> "On direct examination Mr. DeMent was asked why he, as United States Attorney, chose not to prosecute certain other participants or conspirators in the illegal operation. On cross-examination one of the defense attorneys further inquired into the subject. On redirect the Government asked if there were other reasons or factors involved in choosing not to prosecute those particular defendants. At that point the following testimony occurred:

'A. All right; as to Sheriff Horn, Sheriff Horn has been the Sheriff of Crenshaw County for over twenty years. He's been in law enforcement for thirty-four years. He is sixty-three years old and in ill health. He has resigned in disgrace. It would serve, in my judgment, and I might add in your and Mr. Byrne's judgment, no useful purpose to prosecute and convict a man who has served his state for over twenty years and in law enforcement for over thirty-four years and is sixty-three years old and in ill health. When he comes to your through his lawyers and says, "I will resign immediately" and he has two and a half years remaining on his term and he further says, "I will give you a statement to the effect that I will never seek public office again," and his lawyers represent that he will tell you everything he knows about the conspiracy in Crenshaw County to operate —

MR. STRAITON: We object to that, your honor.

THE COURT: Overrule it.

'A. To operate a gambling casino and when he says, "If you need me, I'll testify," we weighed whether we would be better off prosecuting and attempting to convict him or whether we would be better off getting an honest Sheriff in Crenshaw County ap-

pointed by the Governor and I have spoken to Governor Jere Beasley —

MR. LOWERY: We object to that.

THE COURT: I sustain it; that is not responsive.

MR. LOWERY: We move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: That is denied.' "

The Appeals Court held that Mr. DeMent's testimony "contained no remarks directed toward the guilt or innocence of the defendants at the bar." The Appeals Court is clearly in error.

If Mr. DeMent testified that the sheriff was dishonest then certainly this infers guilt of the defendants under 18 U.S.C. Section 1511. Allowing the prosecutor to make assertions of personal knowledge is clearly prejudicial and error under this Court's holding in Berger v. United States, supra, and is error under the prior decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hall v. United States, supra.

The error is cumulative when considered with the fact that the prosecutor was allowed to determine the amount of counsel fees. No action was taken by the trial judge to attempt to erase this prejudicial testimony for the minds of the jury.

IV THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION THAT THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE TO HONOR A REQUEST TO QUALIFY PROSPECTIVE JURORS WITH REFERENCE TO WHETHER THEY WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO TESTIMONY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS THAN OTHER WITNESSES IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR RECENT DECISIONS OF THE FIFTH CRCUIT.

The trial judge refused the Petitioner's request to qualify the prospective jurors as follows:

> "12. Would the fact that a witness was an agent of the F.B.I. cause you to believe his testimony anymore than any other witness?"
>
> "13. Would the fact that a witness was an agent of the F.B.I., cause you to believe that his testimony was less prejudiced or biased than another witness not an agent of the F.B.I."
>
> "14. If a witness is an agent of the F.B.I., would you give his testimony any stronger weight than you would give another witness not an F.B.I. agent?"
>
> "38. Would you give more credibility to the testimony of a government employee in

this case brought by the government than you would to a witness not so employed?"

"39. Would you believe an agent of the F.B.I. to be more truthful as a witness than a witness who was not an agent or government employee?"

The Court below did not discuss this issue saying it was without merit.

The failure of the trial court to qualify the prospective jurors as requested is reversible error. United States v. Gassaway. 456 F.2d 624 (5th Cir., 1964); and United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 539 (5th Cir., 1971).

Further, when the bulk of the prosecution's case is presented by police officers, the failure to qualify the prospective jurors as requested is reversible error. Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir., 1964); and Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir., 1959).

This Court should grant certiorari to determine if the Court of Appeals correctly held this issue void of merit although it has previously held this issue to contain merit. United States v. Gassaway, supra; and United States v. Jackson, supra.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner respectfully submits that Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1955 is unconstitutional inasmuch as there is not a sufficient finding of fact that the activites prohibited by 1955 (b) (i), and (iii) affect interstate commerce. The Petitioner further submits that the Court of Appeals has misapplied the doctrine of harmless error and to allow the decision to stand will obviate this Court's decision in Fahy v. Connecticut, supra.

Respectfully submitted,

CALVIN M. WHITESELL
Counsel For Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

As a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of The United States, I have served copies of the foregoing Petition For Certiorari on the following:

Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Honorable Ira DeMent
United States Attorney
Middle District of Alabama
United States Post Office Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36104

Honorable J. Paul Lowery
Counsel for Petitioner, Thomas Thaggard, Sr.
Suite 1100, Bell Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36104

I respectfully request that this Court enter my appearance as counsel for the Petitioner, Vanzie Beasley.

DONE this the ____ day of August, 1973.

CALVIN M. WHITESELL
Counsel For Petitioner

APPENDIX A

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

THOMAS L. THAGGARD, SR., and
VANZIE BEASLEY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

---

(April 16, 1973)

Before COLEMAN, MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Thomas L. Thaggard, Sr. and Vanzie Beasley of conspiracy wilfully and knowingly to directly and indirectly conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, and own all or part of a gambling business in violation of the laws

of the State of Alabama, involving five or more persons for more than thirty days, 18 U.S.C., §1955.

Defendants were also convicted, in the same trial, of a conspiracy to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State of Alabama pertaining to gambling, 18 U.S.C., §1511.

Upon these verdicts both men were sentenced to three years imprisonment for each offense to run concurrently.

Thaggard and Beasley assign fourteen reasons for the reversal of their convictions.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

In June or July of 1971, Thomas L. Thaggard, Sr. asked one James R. Sadie to become a partner with him and Beasley in a gambling establishment. Thaggard stated, however, that he had heard of a recently enacted federal law against gambling and wanted to check on that law before proceeding further with the enterprise.

Prior to his appointment in that capacity the United States Attorney for that District had represented Thaggard in another prosecution, *Thaggard v. United States*, 5 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 735, cert. denied 383 U.S. 958, so Thaggard went to see his former counsel about the new "federal law". The United States Attorney told Thaggard that he could not and would not advise him as to the statute but did give him a copy of it

and told him to consult some other attorney about the matter. Thaggard did so, stating that there would be only three partners or owners involved in the gambling operation. This attorney told Thaggard that he obviously would be in violation of the laws of Alabama but since "less than five persons would be involved, in his opinion there would be no federal violation".

After this conference, Thaggard, Beasley, and Sadie, as the original owners, opened the gambling house in a concrete building in a remote rural area of Crenshaw County, Alabama. From July until December, 1971, the establishment operated four nights a week. Games of dice and blackjack were played; the customers were served drinks and steaks free. The actual operation of the gambling house, however, required more than three individuals. Several other persons were hired to operate the gaming tables, to prepare food, and to guard the automobiles of the patrons while they were inside the building. A busy night would see as many as fifty or sixty persons participating in the gambling.

Several local public officials were aware of the gambling but did not interfere with it.

Completely read and fairly construed, the record reveals that the defense to the indictments was that the accused knew they were violating the gambling laws of Alabama but, on the advice of counsel, had no intent to violate the federal statutes. In this context the case was tried, the defendants were convicted, and they now appeal.

Against this background we evaluate those assignments of error which, in our opinion, merit discussion.

1.

Because of pre-trial publicity, the trial court erred in not granting Thaggard's motions for continuance and a change of venue.

Thaggard insists that the publicity he received during the protracted litigation of the bank larceny offense, *Thaggard v. United States, supra*, which came to an end seven years previously, had rendered him "notorious in the community". This notoriety, coupled with the publicity given the gambling case, he says, immutably prejudiced his trial. Specifically, he refers to items which ran in the Montgomery Advertiser for the six months immediately preceding his trial.

The first article, on December 2, 1971 named the individuals involved in the gambling house and described in detail the operations of the establishment. The next article on May 5, 1972 featured front page pictures of Ray Horn, Drue Lackey, and Thomas Thaggard, Sr. It listed the individuals named in the indictment and quoted from portions of it. On May 10, 1972 a cartoon depicting a sign advertising the gambling establishment as "Cotton's Place" appeared. The May 12, 1972 issue again named the persons charged in the indictment and stated each count under which the defendants were charged. On June 1, 1972 the paper reported that James Sadie had pleaded guilty to the charges and again named the persons in the indict-

ment. On June 4, 1972 the paper reported the uncovering of a large sports bookmaking operation in the Montgomery area. (There apparently was no connection between this operation and the gambling house.) Several known gamblers, including Thomas L. Thaggard, Sr., were listed as participating in this betting operation. However, no mention was made of the upcoming trial of the defendants involved in the gambling at "Cotton's Place".

Upon qualifying the jury for cause, the trial judge directed all members of the venire who had read or heard anything of the case to stand for special questions. Each was individually asked if he could render a verdict upon the law and the evidence regardless of what had been heard or read. Only one responded in the negative, and was excused. A second juror was disqualified for relationship to an alleged co-conspirator. The remaining eleven of those who had heard or read of the case responded that their verdict would not be affected by what they had heard or read.

The other nineteen members of the venire had not heard or read anything about the case. Thus, the defense began its peremptory challenges with nineteen individuals who had never heard of the case and eleven who had heard of it, although with no fixed opinion as a result of what they had heard or read. The appellants were allowed ten peremptory challenges to the trial panel and one challenge as to the alternate juror. The defense exercised only six of their ten peremptory challenges.

This hardly creates a picture of one who is empaled upon pre-trial hostility or drowned in a sea of fixed opinions.

Whether a change of venue is mandated depends on whether "there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for holding court in that district", Fed.R.Crim.P., Rule 21.

A motion for a change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and in the absence of an abuse of that discretion the trial decision will not be overturned on appeal, *United States v. Nix*, 5 Cir., 1972, 465 F.2d 90.

2.

18 U.S.C., §1955 is an unconstitutional regulation of intrastate activities and is in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The contention of the appellants in this regard is rejected on the authority of *United States v. Harris*, 5 Cir., 1972, 460 F.2d 1041. We hold the statute to be constitutional on its face and there was no unconstitutionality in its application. Out-of-state cars were seen in the gambling house parking lot, poker chips from Las Vegas were used, and interstate telephone calls were made from the gambling house.

3.

18 U.S.C., §1955 and §1511 are unconstitutional in that they exempt activities conducted by a charitable or religious organization.

"The Constitution does not require things which are different in .fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same", *Tigner v. Texas*, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940). The legislative history of 18 U.S.C., §1955 indicates that Congress was concerned with *organized crime*, hence Congress has proscribed the gambling activities on which it believes organized crime of an interstate character thrives and has excluded those situations in which organized crime rarely appears. Accordingly, there was a rational basis for excluding charitable and religious organizations from the purview of these statutes.

4.

The Government failed properly to introduce and prove a violation of Alabama law.

We reject this argument because our examination of the record reveals that the specific statutes of the State of Alabama prohibiting the operation of gambling houses were entered as an exhibit in the case. Moreover, the jury was instructed that a violation of Alabama law must first be found before a conviction could be had. There was really no effort to deny or controvert a violation of the Alabama gambling laws. The argument was that there had been no intent to violate the federal statute. From our reading of the record

it would have been impossible for the jury to have been in any way misled on this point.

5.

The trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the law as to advice of counsel and specific intent.

Appellants contend that the Government was required to prove specific intent to violate federal law, not just specific intent to commit the overt acts. They therefore object to the trial court's definition of specific intent as stated in the instructions. Their defense is that they sought advice of counsel before entering into the gambling operation.

The trial court gave the following instruction on specific intent:

> "Well, you have heard a lot about intent, and you heard me talk to you a few minutes ago that it was a case of specific intent. The offenses charged in this indictment are offenses which require proof of specific intent on the part of each defendant before a defendant can be convicted, can be found guilty. What does specific intent mean? Specific intent means more than a general intent to commit an act or acts. To establish specific intent, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as to a defendant before that defendant can be convicted, that that defendant know-

ingly did an act which the law forbids purposely intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case as reflected by the evidence. It is not necessary that the Government prove, in order to convict a defendant, that a defendant knew each of the elements involved in the substantive statute or each of the elements involved in the statute that the indictment says the conspiracy was formed to violate in count one. It is sufficient that the conspiracy agreement, if any exists, contemplated the commission of a crime and that the crime contemplated is in fact in law a federal crime. The defendants must have specifically intended to commit each act or each of the acts that make up the offenses charged. As a general rule, it is no defense to a criminal prosecution that a defendant acted in good faith relying on the advice of counsel; however, advice of counsel may be shown where it tends to prove or disprove an intent to violate the law. Advice of counsel is not a defense — is not a defense — where it's offered to tend to disprove that the defendant or defendants intended to violate the federal law, however, advice of counsel may be shown and considered by you jurors where it tends to disprove the intent to commit one or more of the acts involved. There must be a specific intent to commit each of the acts required in order to convict. The Government is not required to show that there must be a specific intent to violate

a federal law, but the Government must prove that there was a specific intent to commit each of the acts necessary to prove a violation of the federal law."

The statutes here in question do not condition guilt upon knowledge that a federal law has been violated. It is sufficient that appellants intended to do all of the acts prohibited by the statute and proceeded to do them, *Cruz v. United States*, 10 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 828.

Advice of counsel, when given on full disclosure of all the facts and followed in good faith, may be a matter to be considered by the jury in determining the appellants' guilt, *Shushan v. United States*, 5 Cir., 1941, 117 F.2d 110, cert. denied 313 U.S. 574. But where defendants know that their conduct is violative of state law, their wrongful purpose *ab initio*, established beyond a reasonable doubt, leaves them in no position to claim that they had no intention of violating a federal statute which, in fact, denounced the unlawful conduct as also constituting a federal crime. Defendants may have misunderstood the full reach of the federal statute but they deliberately took that risk when they set out upon a calculated violation of the laws of Alabama. The instructions gave them all, and possibly more than, they were entitled to receive under the facts of this case.

6.

The trial court erred in allowing questions and answers pertaining to a remark made by Thaggard to witness Ben Allen Grooms.

Ben Allen Grooms was employed by the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, a private agency, as a security guard at the gambling establishment. Grooms testified as a witness for the prosecution. During Grooms' testimony, the prosecutor, referring to an overt act charged in Count II of the indictment, asked if Thaggard had ever stated what it cost to operate the place. Grooms answered that when he had expressed a concern about the place being raided, Thaggard replied that he need not worry since he was "paying three hundred dollars a night to open the doors". Thaggard contends that the remark was prejudicial and should not have been allowed. We disagree. This was one of the overt acts charged in the indictment, *United States v. McGann*, 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 1104. The statement was admissible against all the co-conspirators since the statement of one conspirator made in furtherance of a going conspiracy is admissible in evidence against a co-conspirator, *United States v. Nall*, 5 Cir., 1971, 437 F.2d 1177.

7.

The trial court erred in not granting Thaggard's motion for mistrial after the prejudicial comment by the United States Attorney.

The United States called as its only rebuttal witness the United States Attorney who had formerly represented Thaggard but who had not participated in the trial of the instant case because he had been subpoenaed (but not called) as a witness for the defense. This official came to the courtroom from time to time but did not see any substantial portion of the trial.

On direct examination Mr. DeMent was asked why he, as United States Attorney, chose not to presecute certain other participants or conspirators in the illegal operation. On cross-examination one of the defense attorneys further inquired into the subject. On redirect the Government asked if there were other reasons or factors involved in choosing not to prosecute those particular defendants. At that point the following testimony occurred:

> "A. All right; as to Sheriff Horn, Sheriff Horn has been the Sheriff of Crenshaw County for over twenty years. He's been in law enforcement for thirty-four years. He is sixty-three years old and in ill health. He has resigned in disgrace. It would serve, in my judgment, and I might add in your and Mr. Byrne's judgment, no useful purpose to prosecute and convict a man who has served his state for over twenty years and in law enforcement for over thirty-four years and is sixty-three years old and in ill health. When he comes to you through his lawyers and says, 'I will resign immediately', and he has two and a half years remaining on his term and he further says, 'I will give you a statement to the effect that I will never seek public office again', and his lawyers represent that he will tell you everything he knows about the conspiracy in Crenshaw County to operate —

MR. STRAITON: We object to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overrule it.

"A. To operate a gambling casino and when he says, 'If you need me, I'll testify'; we weighed whether we would be better off prosecuting and attempting to convict him or whether we would be better off getting an honest Sheriff in Crenshaw County appointed by the Governor, and I have spoken to Governor Jere Beasley —

MR. LOWERY: We object to that.

THE COURT: I sustain it; that is not responsive.

MR. LOWERY: We move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: That is denied."

Quite obviously, this line of testimony had no business in the trial. Neither side should have been allowed to drag it in. What the United States Attorney did about the prosecution of other defendants or conspirators in this case, and his motives for it, was solely within his discretion, certainly insofar as these or other defendants were concerned, *United States v. Cox*, 5 Cir., 1965, 342 F.2d 167, cert. denied 381 U.S. 935. Nevertheless, the testimony of the United States Attorney merely stated his reasons for not prosecuting the county sheriff. It contained no remarks directed toward the guilt

or innocence of the defendants at the bar. Indeed, Mr. DeMent could have personally known nothing about that, except that he knew of Thaggard's visit to his office which admittedly took place before the alleged criminal activities began. There is nothing in this skirmish which would justify a reversal.

8.

The trial court erred in not granting Thaggard's motion for mistrial after the prejudicial comment by the Alabama District Attorney.

Alabama District Attorney Jesse Oliver Bryan was called as the closing witness for the Government. Bryan's Judicial District included Crenshaw County. During direct testimony, he related the following telephone conversation with Billy King, County Solicitor of Crenshaw County:

"A. On 30 November, I called Billy King in the afternoon and said, 'Billy, do you know anything about any illegal gambling operations going on up in northern Crenshaw County?' And Billy precisely said to me —

MR. STRAITON: Your Honor, we object to this.

THE COURT: Overrule it.

"A. — 'Job, I know about it' — Job is my nickname down there — 'but I swear that I

have never taken a penny from them; Ray Horn has.' And that sent me right up through the ceiling; I didn't believe Ray Horn would do anything like that.

MR. LOWERY: Object to comments by the witness.

THE COURT: Sustain it.

MR. LOWERY: Move the Court for a mistrial.

THE COURT: As to the reaction of the District Attorney as to what County Solicitor King said, it wasn't responsive to the question, it is excluded.

WITNESS: I am sorry; I am sorry.

THE COURT: It is excluded."

This evidentiary occurrence provides no peg upon which to hang a reversal. The objection was "to comments by the witness", the objection was sustained, and the comment was excluded. That ends the matter.

9.

The trial court prejudiced the jury when it admonished Thaggard's attorney.

During recross-examination of the United States Attorney the following colloquy occurred between Thaggard's counsel and the trial court:

> "MR. LOWERY: Yes, sir; your honor, we would move to exclude the testimony of Mr. DeMent as to the reasons stated for his selection of the various parties in this charge; on the grounds that it was highly prejudicial, it invaded the province of the jury as to whether — the guilt or innocence of the parties.
>
> "THE COURT: Well, a trial is not a game, Mr. Lowery. The trial is to get the truth of the matter, and you have permeated this trial with questions and statements and testimony that a deal has been made and that some had been chosen and some hadn't been chosen. Fairness requires that he be allowed to explain it; so your motion is denied.
>
> "MR. LOWERY: All right, sir; we move for a mistrial.
>
> "THE COURT: That motion is denied."

Relying on the authority of *United States v. Coke*, 2 Cir., 1964, 339 F.2d 183; *Gudger v. United States*, D.C. Cir., 1963, 314 F.2d 268, *United States v. Ah Kee Eng*, 2 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 157; and *United States v. Minuse*, 2 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 36, Thaggard contends that the trial court's comment was so prejudicial as to require a reversal. But in each of these cases with

the exception of *Gudger*, the appellate court reversed on the basis of *numerous* and *continuing* comments and remarks by the trial judge. And the short *per curiam* decision in *Gudger* emphasized that the trial judge's admonishment of defense counsel's impugnment of a government witness may have negated counsel's entire attack on credibility, thus invading the province of the jury. Any prejudice attributable to the court's solitary comment was cured by his charge to the jury that they were to draw no inferences from any comments he may have made during the trial, *Lacaze v. United States*, 5 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 516.

10.

The trial court erred in allowing the Government to question the amount of fee Thaggard's attorney received.

To at least one member of this panel, this is the most questionable aspect of the trial. As already stated, the defense, however poor it may have been, was that Thaggard and Beasley were relying on advice of counsel that their participation in the gambling establishment did not amount to a violation of federal law. In support of this defense, Mr. Straiton, a trial attorney for Thaggard, took the witness stand to verify the advice he had given Thaggard prior to the commencement of activities.

After his direct testimony, the following occurred on cross-examination.

BY MR. SEGREST (Assistant United States Attorney):

"Q What is — what was your fee for this advice?

"A. I think my fee was fifty dollars, Mr. Segrest.

"Q. What is your fee in this case?

MR. WHITESELL: We object to that.

THE COURT: I sustain it.

MR. SEGREST: Your Honor, don't you think that would be admissible on bias, to show his bias in this case and as a witness.

MR. LOWERY: We will stipulate we got a fee, Your Honor; but we object to any discussion of the amount.

MR. SEGREST: We think the amount of it, the extent of it, would certainly affect his judgment and integrity as a witness and we would ask for permission to ask him that question.

THE COURT: All right; go ahead.

"Q. What is your fee in this case, Mr. Straiton?

MR. LOWERY: We object.

THE COURT: Overrule it; I will permit it on that theory; I think I would have to.

"A. The fee that I received from Mr. Cotton Thaggard for representing — representing him was twenty five hundred dollars.
"Q. Now, what is the total fee of your firm; you — you are part of a firm, aren't you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What —
"A. Six thousand dollars.
"Q. And is that the total fee that you are to be paid in this case?
"A. Sir?
"Q. Is that the total extent of the fee you are to be paid in this case?
"A. Well, that is the total fee; yes.
"Q. How about expenses, now; are you to be paid expenses in addition?
"A. Yes, sir."

Cross-examination as to the amount of the fee paid to counsel for services in the case *then on trial before the jury* should not have been admitted. Attorney Straiton took the stand to verify Thaggard's request for legal advice. Without objection he stated that he received a fee for the advice and it was stipulated that the trial attorneys were receiving a fee for their services. The objection was to stating the amount of the fee. The prosecutor stated that he wished to prove the amount as reflecting the possible bias and prejudice (credibility) of the attorney-witness. If the jury wished to consider Straiton's status as attorney as bearing upon his credibility, that fact had been obvious from the beginning of the trial. That he had been paid a

fee had been stipulated. Defendants have a constitutional right to counsel and attorneys are not expected to work free, even for indigents. The Criminal Justice Act provides some remuneration even for court appointed attorneys, although paid by the taxpayers. As we divine it, the real purpose for eliciting this information was to suggest that it took a big-time gambler to pay such a fee, plus the thought that Thaggard really feared a conviction and was willing to pay a "big fee" in the hope of avoiding conviction. We have no doubt that under ordinary circumstances this maneuver was both improper and prejudicial and would warrant a reversal.

Nevertheless, upon mature reflection and cool analysis we are left with an abiding conviction that the guilt of the defendants in this case was so irrefutably evident that even in an errorless trial an acquittal would have been an incredible event. Under the jurisprudence applicable to errors which are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we decline to reverse the convictions.

We are not unaware of the proposition that allowing prosecutors to escape reversal by the application of the harmless error rule may tempt some to wield any available stick, if the trial court permits it, hoping to get the conviction first and then to take refuge at the altar of harmless error. Prosecutors should try their cases within the rules of evidence and our decision in this case is never to be construed as an invitation to do otherwise. We decide this case on the precept that the ends of justice do not require a rever-

sal for this lapse; otherwise, one unhesitatingly would be ordered.

The remaining points of the fourteen originally raised do not merit discussion.

The judgment of the District Court as to both appellants is

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

THOMAS L. THAGGARD, SR., and
VANZIE BEASLEY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

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ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion Apr. 16, 1973, 5 Cir., 1973, ____ F.2d ____).

(June 8, 1973)

Before COLEMAN, MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: The Petitions for rehearing are DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the Petitions for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

THOMAS L. THAGGARD, SR.,
VANZIE BEASLEY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

---

(June 28, 1973)

Before COLEMAN, MORGAN and RONEY,
Circuit Judges.

ON CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION of Vanzie Beasley for recall and stay of judgment issued as mandate in the above numbered and entitled cause, pending an application for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,

IT IS ORDERED that the judgment issued as mandate, be recalled and stayed to and including August

1, 1973, the stay to continue in force until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court, provided that within said period there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari petition has been filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue the judgment as mandate upon the filing of a copy of an order of the supreme court denying the writ, or upon the expiration of the above period unless the above mentioned certificate shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court within that time.

APPENDIX D

Title 18, U.S. Code Annotated, Section 1955.

(a) (b) & (e) Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses

(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b) As used in this section —

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which —

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and,

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and territory or possession of the United States.

(e) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under the paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member or employee of such organization except as compensation for ac-

tual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

APPENDIX E

Title 18, U.S. Code Annotated, Section 1511.

(a) (b) & (c) Obstruction of State or Local law enforcement

(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if —

(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy;

(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and

(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or

owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.

(b) As used in this section —

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which —

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under paragraph (3) of

subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member, or employee of such organization, except as compensation for actual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

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Nos. 73-242 and 73-255

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

THOMAS L. THAGGARD, SR., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VANZIE BEASLEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General,
HENRY E. PETERSEN,
Assistant Attorney General,
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525-281—73——1

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-242

THOMAS L. THAGGARD, SR., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 73-255

VANZIE BEASLEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (*Thaggard* Pet. App. A) is reported at 477 F. 2d 626.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 16, 1973, and petitions for rehearing were denied on June 8, 1973 (*Thaggard* Pet. App. B). The

In early summer of 1971, petitioner Thaggard proposed to petitioner Beasley and one James Sadie that they establish a gambling operation in a rural part of Crenshaw County, Alabama.[2] The three men became partners in the endeavor, each providing capital for the enterprise (Tr. 46–57, 58, 107–110, 414–415, 572–573, 587–588). The gambling operation commenced in late July 1971 and continued to operate through December 1971 (Tr. 59–63, 72–74, 141, 288–297, 375–378, 499, 500, 522–523, 527–529). Games of dice and blackjack were played, and customers were served steaks and drinks without charge (Tr. 63, 68, 72–73, 78–79, 288–297). Several persons were hired to operate the gaming tables, to prepare food, and to guard the patrons' automobiles. Petitioner Thaggard and several of these employees testified at trial, admitting the operation of a gambling establishment (Tr. 107–113, 120–121, 176–181, 212–214, 220–222, 453–455, 461, 467, 622–632). Several patrons of the establishment testified as well (Tr. 228–234, 240–247, 252–257, 260–262, 406–411).

When petitioner Thaggard initially approached Sadie, he advised him that there would be no interference from Crenshaw County law enforcement officials (Tr. 52–53). When the enterprise commenced operation, one employee expressed to petitioner Thaggard his concern that the gambling house might be raided. Petitioner Thaggard advised him that there was no cause for concern, because he was paying $300 a night "to keep the doors open" (Tr. 187–191). In

[2] Sadie, whose case was severed, testified for the government.

fact, local law enforcement officials did not interfere with the operation.

Agent James Day of the FBI, who was acquainted with petitioner Beasley, asked him about the gambling establishment, and Beasley admitted its operation (Tr. 375–380). After receiving this information, agent Day notified Alabama State authorities, who on November 30 conveyed that information to the local district attorney, Jessie Bryan (Tr. 378). Bryan then telephoned the County Solicitor, William King. (King and County Sheriff Ray Horn were indicted with petitioners on the Section 1511 charges; their cases were severed.) When asked whether he knew of the operation, King said he did. He also said that he had taken no money with respect to the gambling operation, but that Sheriff Horn had (Tr. 428–431).

County Solicitor King testified and denied having made this statement (Tr. 494–496). He did, however, admit knowledge that the gambling operation existed and that it operated in violation of state law. He had himself gambled at the establishment (Tr. 499–501). Telephone logs revealed sixty telephone calls between King and petitioner Beasley during the period of the conspiracy (Tr. 368) and two calls placed to King's residence from the gambling establishment (Tr. 504).

Sheriff Horn testified that he was aware through petitioner Thaggard of the operation of the illegal gambling establishment. He denied, however, the existence of any agreement not to interfere with the operation (Tr. 414–426).

The defense to the Section 1955 charge was that petitioners did not realize they were violating federal

law. In petitioner Thaggard's case, this belief was ostensibly predicated upon advice of counsel. When petitioner Thaggard initially approached Sadie in mid-1971, Thaggard told him that the proposed operation would not violate federal law (Tr. 52–53). According to Sadie, Thaggard stated that he had been advised by the United States Attorney, Ira De Ment, that the government would not prosecute (Tr. 76–77).

Petitioner Thaggard testified that he had consulted De Ment, who had represented petitioner while in private practice, because he had heard there was a new federal statute on gambling. De Ment supplied him with a copy of the statute (18 U.S.C. 1955) but, according to Thaggard, told him that he could not advise him with respect to the statute because it was new and there were no cases construing it and because it was too ambiguous. De Ment suggested that he take the statute to an attorney (Tr. 574–575, 577–579). Thaggard then consulted attorney James Straiton, his trial counsel. According to petitioner Thaggard, Straiton advised him that because only three persons would be financing and managing the operation, it would not be a violation of federal law; Thaggard testified that he relied on this advice (Tr. 580–584).

Straiton testified that he had analyzed the statute for petitioner and advised him that, although there were as yet no cases construing the statute, it was his opinion that the law was aimed at syndicated gambling. He conveyed to petitioner his opinion that, since only three partners would be involved, the operation would not violate the clear intent of the statute (Tr. 543–548). He stressed to petitioner that this advice was merely his

interpretation (Tr. 545). Straiton also testified that petitioner well knew that the operation would be in violation of state law (Tr. 552, 556).

United States Attorney De Ment testified that petitioner Thaggard had approached him for a copy of the new federal gambling statute. He provided petitioner with a copy but did not interpret it for him. Contrary to Thaggard's testimony, De Ment testified that he told him that the statute was quite clear. He did advise Thaggard to take the statute to his attorney and also indicated that he would prosecute if Thaggard violated the law (Tr. 637–639). Thaggard told De Ment that he was going to open a gambling house. De Ment told him it was a violation of state law, to which petitioner responded, "I can handle the locals" (Tr. 644). Two weeks after having received a copy of the statute, petitioner Thaggard again contacted De Ment, stating that he had read the statute and saw no "way to get around it", and De Ment told him that his impression was quite correct (Tr. 645).

When agent Day spoke with petitioner Beasley, he advised him that the gambling operation might violate federal law. While Beasley indicated that he wished to avoid violating federal law, he never stated that he did not realize that he was violating federal law (Tr. 379–381, 387–390). An employee of the establishment testified that when he asked the partners whether the gambling operation violated federal law, they replied that as far as they knew there was no violation (Tr. 455). Sadie, in particular, said that there was nothing to worry about because if they were in violation of federal law, they did not know it (Tr. 466).

525-281—73——2

ARGUMENT

1. Both petitioners contend that because, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1955, the government need not demonstrate that a particular gambling enterprise has any impact upon interstate commerce, that statute unconstitutionally regulates intrastate activities. Relying upon the legislative determination that illegal gambling is an enterprise which involves the widespread use of interstate facilities and significantly affects interstate commerce, the courts of appeals have consistently rejected such claims, *United States* v. *Hunter,* 478 F. 2d 1019, 1020–1021 (C.A. 7); *United States* v. *Palmer,* 465 F. 2d 697 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 874; *United States* v. *Becker,* 461 F. 2d 230, 233–234 (C.A. 2); *United States* v. *Riehl,* 460 F. 2d 454, 458 (C.A. 3); *Schneider* v. *United States,* 459 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 8), and there is no reason for this Court to review the decision of the court of appeals in this regard.

2. Petitioner Thaggard also contends that because eleemosynary organizations—*i.e.,* those exempt from tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended—are exempt from the coverage of the statute, Section 1955 violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[3] The exemption reflects, however, a rational and valid

[3] Although the petition relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment, which is inapplicable to acts of Congress, we treat the petition as contending that Section 1955 violates the similar requirements of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See *United States Department of Agriculture* v. *Moreno,* No. 72–534 (decided June 25, 1973).

distinction. See *Tigner* v. *Texas*, 310 U.S. 141. The legislative history indicates that Section 1955, part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 937, is primarily aimed at gambling enterprises, the profits of which, Congress concluded, constitute a major source of power for organized crime. See *United States* v. *Harris*, 460 F. 2d 1041, 1044–1048 (C.A. 5). Exemption of essentially non-profit organizations from the coverage of Section 1955 is logically consistent with that purpose. Nor does the exemption, to the extent it includes religious organizations, contravene the establishment clause of the First Amendment, as petitioner urges. See *Walz* v. *Tax Commission*, 397 U.S. 664.

3. Petitioners also contend that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to inquire, in cross-examining Straiton (petitioner Thaggard's counsel, who testified as a defense witness) as to the amount of the fee received by Straiton for his representation of petitioner Thaggard in this case. The court accepted the prosecutor's position that such questioning was relevant to show the witness's bias and credibility (Tr. 550–551). Petitioners urge that this line of questioning was particularly prejudicial, since profitability was in effect an element of the offense. The court of appeals concluded, without considering the profitability argument, that inquiry as to "the amount of fee paid to counsel for services in the case *then on trial before the jury*" was improper (*Thaggard* Pet. App. A12; emphasis in original). The court concluded, however, that the evidence with respect to operation of the

gambling house, virtually unrefuted even at trial and supplied in large part by petitioner Thaggard and other principals, was so overwhelming that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that "an acquittal would have been an incredible event" even had petitioners received an errorless trial (*id.* at A12–A13). That conclusion was supported by the record in this case and does not warrant review by this Court.

4. During cross-examination of government witnesses Horn and King, the defense fully explored the witnesses' motives for testifying. Responses to questioning aimed at determining why these men had not been prosecuted disclosed that both believed the cases against them, which had been severed, would be dropped in return for their testimony. At one point in the questioning, defense counsel strongly implied that the charges against King were to be dismissed because the prosecutor knew King had not received anything to obstruct enforcement of the gambling laws. (Tr. 583–584, 671–672.)

When De Ment testified in rebuttal, the decision to prosecute certain individuals and to forego prosecution of others was explored more fully. He testified that as United States Attorney he considered it more important that these public officials resign their offices than that they be prosecuted, and he agreed to drop the charges against them in return for their resignations and their cooperation as witnesses (Tr. 642, 649, 658–663).

This line of questioning, in an area first explored by defense counsel and designed both to expose the

situation fully to the jury and to counter defense counsel's implication that the decision not to prosecute these individuals was due to an insufficiency of evidence, was not in our view improper under the circumstances. The court of appeals thought otherwise, concluding that neither side should have entered this area, at least to the extent that it involved the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The court concluded, however, that the testimony, while improperly admitted, did not warrant reversal (*Thaggard* Pet. App. A7–A9). Accepting the premise of the court of appeals, this conclusion was correct.

5. Finally, petitioner Beasley asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to qualify prospective jurors by inquiring whether they would attach greater weight to the testimony of law enforcement officials than to that of ordinary witnesses. The contention is without merit. The failure to give such an instruction constitutes no abuse of discretion where, as here (Tr. 150–151, 157, 900–903), the jury is otherwise properly instructed on the standards for weighing and evaluating testimony. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Jackson*, 448 F. 2d 539, 541–543 (C.A. 5);[4] *Ross* v. *United States*, 374 F. 2d. 97, 105 (C.A. 8), certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 822;

[4] Petitioner's reliance upon *Brown* v. *United States*, 338 F. 2d 543 (C.A.D.C.), and *Sellers* v. *United States*, 271 F. 2d 475 (C.A.D.C.), is misplaced. In those cases, refusal to give the tendered instruction was held to be reversible error where the testimony of law enforcement officials was virtually the entire case for the prosecution. In this case, the government relied heavily upon the testimony of the principals and that of employees and customers of the gambling establishment.

Gorin v. *United States*, 313 F. 2d 641, 646–647 (C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 374 U.S. 829.

CONCLUSION

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petitions for writs of certiorari should be denied.

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